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ABSTRACT
The ubiquity of small scale digital devices (SSDD), the public’s ever increasing societal dependence
on SSDD, and the continual presence of SSDD at all types of crime scenes, including non-technical
and violent crimes, demand a formalized curriculum for the education and training of future cyber
forensic examiners. This paper presents the various SSDD forensics labs currently in use and under
development for future use at the Purdue University Cyber Forensics Laboratory. The primary
objective of each module is to provide specific real-world cases for the learning, comprehension, and
understanding of hands-on investigative techniques and methodologies. The purpose of this paper is to
outline those elements that will make effective Small Scale Digital Device Forensics labs.
Keywords: Forensics, Cyber Forensics, Digital Evidence, Education, Training, Small Scale Digital
Devices, Personal Digital Technologies

1.0 INTRODUCTION
As Small Scale Digital Devices (SSDD) have become so pervasive in the daily social fabric of our
lives, they have also presented a wealth of information for our forensic examiners. As personal storage
units of all that is important to our social lives, these devices tell of who we know, who we
communicate with, and what we find worth capturing.
As treasure troves, these SSDD are not easy “nuts to crack.” Over the past ten years, the world of
computer forensics has had the luxury of a limited handful of file system formats, being ensconced in
forensic standards and systems developed to acquire and analyze these evidentiary hard drives. As
SSDD forensics is still in its infancy, forensic examiners are still debating the standards and methods
for acquiring these idiosyncratic devices (Ayers et al., 2007; SWGDE, 2007; Ayers et al., 2006;
Gratzner, Naccache, Znaty, 2006; InterPol, 2006; McCarthy, 2005; ACPO/NHTCU, n.d.; IOCE,
2000).
2.0 SMALL SCALE DIGITAL DEVICES
By definition a Small Scale Digital Device is “a small form factor device which utilizes permanent or
temporary memory in conjunction with embedded chips to perform a variety of tasks” (Harrill and
Mislan, 2007). Categorically, SSDD have been further defined by the various types of devices:



Personal Digital Assistants
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Cellular Telephones



Audio / Video Devices



Gaming Devices



Other Devices

As the name suggests, SSDD are characterized by their physical size which appears to be diminishing
over time. As these devices grow smaller, and more personal, they have extended functionalities
storing massive amounts of information. Furthermore, many of these SSDD provide the means of
synchronizing information to another computer, whether through wired or wireless networks such as
WiFi or Bluetooth.
2.1 Personal Digital Assistants
In 1992, Jeff Hawkins spawned the beginning of the Personal Digital Assistant rage that ran well
through the last part of the century. Soon after, names like Newton, Nino, Palm, iPaq, and Zaurus
became handheld household names. Providing Personal Information Management (PIM) applications
like calendars, contacts, task lists, and memo pads, these devices became the device du jour for the
business world.
2.2 Mobile Telephones
In 1973, when Martin Cooper placed the first call on his “Brick Phone”, a revolution started that has
forever changed the social fabric of our daily lives. Mobile phones of today are so ubiquitous (Jansen,
Ayers, 2006), that rather than just placing calls, these devices provide technologies for Short Message
Service (SMS) messaging, Multi-Media Messaging Service (MMS) messaging, Instant Messaging
(IM), electronic mail, Web browsing, multimedia capturing and playback, electronic document
previewing, basic Personal Information Management (PIM) applications (e.g., contacts, calendar, etc.)
and financial transactions (Willassen, 2003).
2.3 Audio/Video Devices
In 2001, Apple Computer started a revolution changing the face of the music industry overnight. With
the birth of the iPod, a whole world of music lovers started “ripping” their CD collections to store on
these portable music devices. Not long after the birth of the iPod, and many years after the beta vs.
VHS wars, came the world of portable digital video players. Digital video players have become so
prevalent thanks to products like Apple’s Video iPod that it is not uncommon to carry entire seasons
of syndicated television in one’s pocket or purse. Unfortunately, today’s criminals have also found
that these large portable hard drives can store much more information than just music (Marsico and
Rogers, 2005).
Finally, an overarching characteristic of SSDD is the variety of the different manufacturers, service
providers, operating systems, technologies, form factors, and data and power cables. The
combinatorial explosions that culminate from these various categories and characteristics of SSDD
lend to a wide variety of physical and virtual possibilities (Gratzner, Naccache, Znaty, 2006).
3.0 FORENSICS OF SMALL SCALE DIGITAL DEVICES
In today’s wired society, many crime scenes are littered with some type of digital evidence (Robinson
and Smith, 2001). More times than not, crimes scene evidence is found on a thumb drive, a cell phone,
or another type of SSDD. Unfortunately, first responders don’t always realize the potential timecriticality and sensitivity of such digital evidence. With the ever-increasing storage capacitance and
the ever-decreasing physical size of these devices, it is imperative to prepare our future forensic
examiners and investigators with the tools and techniques for analyzing these evidentiary devices.
SSDD Forensics is the science of recovering digital evidence from SSDD under forensically sound
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conditions using accepted methods (Harrill and Mislan, 2007). SSDD, especially those with advanced
capabilities, are a relatively recent phenomenon, not usually covered in classical computer forensics
(Jansen and Ayers, 2005). Thus, it has become a major initiative at the Purdue University Cyber
Forensics Laboratory to create a SSDD Forensics course with representative labs.
As digital technology evolves, the existing capabilities of these devices continue to improve rapidly.
When SSDD are involved in a crime or other incident, forensic examiners require tools that allow the
proper retrieval and speedy examination of information present on the device (Jansen and Ayers,
2006). Unfortunately, these exist as a “Swiss Army knife” collection of tools from various
manufacturers, open source groups, or underground, black hat, or hacker sources. As an endorsement
of the “Swiss Army knife” approach, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE,
2007) suggests the following procedure when examining Mobile Phones:
1. Use proven and validated hardware/software solutions. If the phone includes a SIM card,
examine the card with and without the handset.
2. Use open source, free, or manufacturer-specific tools.
3. Use wireless transfer methods such as Bluetooth or Infrared.
4. Use the suspect device to display data while photographing or videotaping the screen.
5. Transcribe information viewed on the device to include call logs, phone books, text messages,
etc.
6. Use the suspect device to E-Mail or forward the data to an examination device. In the event
this method is used, the examiner must document why this method was used and the steps
taken. The examiner must also ensure that the data received is an accurate depiction of what
was on the suspect device.
As with cell phones, the multiple attempts of data acquisition work well with other types of SSDD.
These multiple attempts are directly related to the multiple tools that the students are exposed to:
DirSnoop, Access Data FTK, GSM .XRY, Cellebrite UME36, Secure View, Device Seizure, SIMCon,
SIMIS, iDEN Companion Pro, iDEN Phonebook Manager, iDEN Media Downloader, Blackberry
Desktop Manager, Amber Blackberry Converter, Oxygen Phone Manager, MobilEdit!, TULP2G,
Nokia PC Suite, Sony Ericson PC Suite, various Flasher Boxes, several of our own developed tools,
and various other data synchronization tools.
The main reason so many tools are necessary for SSDD forensics is that combinatorial explosion
mentioned earlier. A good example of this is the Motorola RAZR cell phone. To date there are over
twelve versions of this single phone, ranging from the RAZR V3 to the V9, each with its own
technological modifications. Beyond the minor form factor variations, the manufacturer, Motorola, has
recently changed the data/power connection from Mini USB to the newer Micro USB standard (Open
Mobile Terminal Platform, 2007). To add to this, each network service provider adjusts the operating
system or application software to their specific needs. Beyond this, a user may implement changes
specific to their personal preferences. With so many variables, it makes this field of forensics ever-so
dynamic, with a challenge at every turn (McCarthy, 2005; Robinson and Smith, 2001).
3.1 Lab Modules
To prepare our students for our reality and their future, we have designed real-world forensic labs
based on cases taken from the headlines or various examiners experiences. The details are well
developed and the actual devices, tools, and techniques are used throughout the forensic acquisition,
preservation, analysis, and presentation of each case.
Currently, we are working with five labs: a murder, a kidnapping, a meth lab, corporate IP theft, and
military intelligence gathering. Each lab is unique including at least ten different individuals,
background case information, details about the suspects and victims, and at least five small scale
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digital devices. Each of these devices includes evidence that can either help or hurt the investigation.
In some instances, the evidence may point the students towards the Internet, leveraging information
(either planted or previously existed) to further their investigations.
The goal for each of these labs is to take the students from cradle to grave of an actual investigation,
learning how to process each type of SSDD evidence using the actual forensic tools and techniques
that may or may not support these devices. This is not only about learning the proper techniques to
handle, acquire, analyze, and present the evidence, but also how to determine if the newly found
information is useful or not. The added elements of realism and surprise provide for an ever-engaging
and thought-provoking environment.
In each lab, students are presented with multiple SSDD, all interacting with each other at various
levels. One unique case is the Meth Lab Explosion, which revolves around the remnants of a Meth
Lab, several badly burned victims, and several suspects who may or may not have been involved in
the activities which led up to the explosion. Given this scenario, the devices found on the scene
include the melted thumb drive, charred cell phone, and its SIM card. Other evidence collected from
the suspects includes the Blackberry and two iDEN phones.
The SIM Card was found in the charred cell phone, which was still in the hand of a young college girl
who died in the horrific explosion. Also found at the scene was a melted thumb drive in the pocket of
another young college boy. With the SIM Card alone, the students are possibly able to determine who
she knew, who she had been communicating with (SMS, MMS), and who she might have been called
last. The thumb drive may have files related to the activities of the event or may be totally unrelated.
The Blackberry and the iDEN phones are related to the accident, but are from suspects who escaped or
were not present at the explosion. Ideally, these devices will also provide further information for the
investigation or lead to dead ends.
4.0 EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS & EXPECTATIONS: CONTROLS AND
VALIDATION
4.1 Validation in the Absence of Hashing
The nature of many of these devices often precludes the use of hashing as a validation method.
There remains a need to establish reliable methods for verifying what data was placed on the device
pre-seizure, and that (preferably) no data was placed on the device post-seizure or, if data was placed
on the device (due to practical constraints) the report includes comprehensive documentation
explaining why, and placing a verifiable boundary on what data could and could not have been altered.
Specific methods will vary from device to device, but instilling the necessity into the minds of future
examiners is an important element in the development of lab exercises.
4.2 Use of Known Values
“How do you know if you’ve found all the evidence?” “How do you know if everything you’ve found
is evidence?” These are questions that have plagued analysts for years, particularly in the field of
digital recovery. In real life, it is usually impossible to answer these questions with certainty. In a
training environment, it is imperative that students receive timely feedback to determine that the
procedure they used was successful or not successful. There is a strong risk that ineffective or, worse,
partially effective classroom techniques will carry over into on the job practices down the road. The
specifics vary widely, but generally take one of two forms:
(1) The instructor inserts known values (which are unknown to the students) into piece of media and
the student has to apply learned techniques, and ideally, some creative problem solving to find these
values. Generally, this is a device that is being treated and handled as simulated evidence. This
enables the instructor to reliably measure the degree of success of the students' evidence handling and
processing methodologies as well as their interpretation of results.
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(2) The student takes predetermined steps using noted values and then uses learned techniques and
tools to observe the actual results. Because this involves actual changes to the device, this form is
limited to devices that are NOT being treated as simulated evidence in the lab. This has the advantage
of allowing the student to gain a greater understanding of the "cause and effect" relationship between a
variety of user actions, and the digital artifacts that are created as a result of those actions.
4.3 Investigative Roles and the Big Picture
The process of retrieving useful information from a device and placing it in evidentiary context
involves multiple roles (Ayers, Jansen, Cilleros, and Daniellou, 2006). Over the course of a semester,
students are rotated through as many of these roles as possible as each simulated case is processed.
This not only gives the student the experience of that role, but in dealing with the interactions between
the roles as well. Full implementation of all roles in every exercise will not always be practical or
necessary, and the emphasis in most cases will be on the role of the examiner. The typical “flow” of
the ideal process will follow the steps outlined in Figure 1 below:
Acquisition/Seizure
- Can be a physical or paper
exercise
- Students must take steps to
preserve volatile memory and
ensure RF isolation
- Multiple devices may be
seized for a single case

Assignment
(In some scenarios, this step
will be omitted for smaller,
and single item “cases”)
- Student in this role, must
“assign” specific devices to
students filling the
“examiner/analyst” role.

Transport
(In most labs exercises, this will
be combined with the
acquisition phase)

Receiving

- Mostly a paper exercise

- Optionally, instructor can also
insert “mistakes” in required,
prefabricated documentation
(i.e. search warrant) that the
student must find and correct.

- Students must preserve chain
of custody, as well as data
integrity (RF isolation, volatile
memory)

- Student in this role must verify
previous students’ work

Processing / Analysis

Reporting

- Using approved tools and
methods, the student must
extract information from the
device(s)

- A student must take the role of
lead investigator

- The student must recognize
information of relevant
evidentiary value

- Results of the analysis of
multiple devices must be
correlated into a single, coherent
report.

Fig. 1: Flow of Forensic Process
4.4 Establishing Goals and Objectives
On the surface, the requirement is deceptively obvious. As discussed earlier, the evidence to be found
consists of known values, evidence handling procedures are standardized, and must be adhered to.
Furthermore, the end result is supposed to be the concrete identification of a single individual to be
held culpable for the commission of a defined illegal act. It is tempting, therefore, to see the process as
some kind of flowchart with correct and incorrect steps to follow, or as a series of yes/no questions,
with corresponding right and wrong answers that can be objectively graded the same way every time.
This in turn, can easily draw the instructor to treat the process as a demonstration of the “application”
category of the cognitive domain (Anderson, et al, 2001) where the student need only follow the
correct steps every time to achieve success. Giving into that temptation would leave the student
woefully unprepared for “the real world” and ignores several factors critical to the successful handling,
reporting and presentation of digital evidence.
It is important to remember that while certain steps and procedures must always be observed
regardless of the circumstances, there remain many variables that render a pure “flow chart process”
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approach to investigation generally ineffective. The type of crime or suspected activity varies from
case to case. Technical considerations also vary widely from case to case, the number and type of
evidence items, the services that the suspect(s) or other related parties may or may not have used, their
relation ship to alleged activities all vary widely. Active attempts by investigative subjects to remove
potential evidence will affect not only the results of the process, but the actual steps of the process.
The students’ work product is, in fact, a synthesis, and can often require a great deal of creativity.
Students must not only use a tool correctly, but must first evaluate a variety of factors in selecting the
correct tool to use. Throughout the process, the students must repeatedly form hypotheses, and must
then devise and perform tests for each (or correctly recognize when a hypothesis cannot be tested with
available evidence or resources).
Even though the simulated evidence may have been prepared, and 100% of the evidence artifacts a
known factor to the instructor, it is not always reasonable to use the number of specific items found
and recorded as a standard to measure success. It is not generally feasible for every potential digital
artifact to be manually evaluated, and more than one path may lead to a correct, verifiable conclusion.
We cannot hold the student to a standard that would be unachievable in the field.
It remains that there must be a “right answer”, and it must be correct and objective. It must be clear
when the student has succeeded, and just as clear when the student has not. There are objective
elements to a successful examination. Success of the examination can be determined by looking at
these elements in the context of the specific case scenario. These elements include:



Was the case solved? Was a correct conclusion reached? To be considered successful
the evidence and its analysis should clearly show that an identified individual is the
guilty party to such a degree that no reasonable person would disagree with the
conclusion.
***Note that this does not necessarily require that every digital artifact on a device be the
subject of human analysis.



Were forensically sound procedures followed throughout the process? Was any
evidence altered or lost as a result of the evidence handling or processing?



Were the hypotheses formed reasonable? Were the tests devised to test those
hypotheses effective and correctly executed and interpreted?



Did the student reach and state conclusions that are not supported by the evidence
found (regardless of the factual correctness of the conclusion)? Was there any
misinterpretation of the evidence?



Did the student look in reasonable appropriate places for both incriminating and
exculpatory evidence?
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS

To build these labs, we have built up quite an extensive inventory of SSDD. On campus we worked
with our telecommunication office to offload their inventory of old or broken phones and PDAs. In the
community we worked our local Women’s Shelter and continually help them sort through their
incoming inventory of donated phones. Globally, we are working with several recycling companies to
increase our library of cell phones. To date, we have built up a collection of over three hundred unique
SSDD and are currently in the development of a forensic acquisition tool testing database and a SSDD
forensics knowledge base, providing a needed resource for federal, state, and local law enforcement
forensic examiners.
In addition to gathering more equipment, we are also looking forward to additional forensic labs. The
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current plans are to incorporate other devices such as portable gaming devices, handheld GPS systems,
VOIP and satellite phones, and carputers. Additionally, other features we might add include practical
exercises for accessing obstructed (password protected) devices. The one thing we can count on in this
field is that the memory capacitance will increase, and the device will get smaller.
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